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I INTRODUCTION 
Money has been described as the lifeblood of government. 
1 In 2002, local 
government and its financing were reformed in order to increase transparency, 
accountability and fiscal responsibility.2 This paper examines the Wellington 
City Council's "Greening of the Quays" project to illustrate the role of accounting 
in facilitating the accountability of local authorities. First, this paper reviews the 
development of financial controls on local authorities in New Zealand. I submit 
that, from the day local government was established, its financial autonomy has 
been eroded by central government. Secondly, this paper reviews the statutory, 
and policy, framework governing the financial accountability of local authorities. 
In doing so, it examines the role of accounting from the perspective of the main 
actors in local government. 
Thirdly, this paper analyses whether the potential for personal liability in 
the Local Government Act 2002 ("the LGA 2002") facilitates accountability 
within local government. Finally, this paper evaluates the ability of accounting, 
as a discipline, to facilitate citizens participating in policy debate. I submit that 
financial reports make a positive contribution, but ultimately do not enable 
citizens to assess whether local authorities are acting in the best interests of their 
locality. Thirdly, this paper examines the English approach to accounting in local 
authorities. I submit that New Zealand should consider introducing performance 
indicators for local government similar to those existing in England. 
II THE DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL CONTROLS 
The notion of local government is essentially that citizens in a locality 
elect representatives to make governmental decisions about their locality. 
3 In 
1842, Governor FitzRoy established the first modem local self-government in 
1 Colin Scott "Accountability in the Regulatory State" (2000) 27 J Law and Soc 38, 45. 
2 Local Government Act 2002, s 3. 
3 International Union of Local Authorities Declaration of Self-Government - European Charter of 
Local Self-Government (1993), art 1. 
New Zealand.4 Hobson modelled that structure on the English system existing at 
that date. 5 The origins of New Zealand's modem local government framework, 
and the financial controls on it, are in post-industrial England. 6 As with England,7 
New Zealand is a unitary state: local government is legally (and constitutionally) 
subordinate to central government. Local government is a creature of statute. 
Finance is essential to good governance and cannot be isolated from other aspects 
of local government. 8 
A strategic approach to decision-making requires symmetry between 
decisions relating to expenditure and decisions relating to revenue. 9 This paper 
focuses on the expenditure side of the equation. It addresses the rating and other 
funding mechanisms available to local authorities when doing so is relevant to the 
financial controls on local government. The following discussion traces the 
development of those financial controls from 1842 till 2008. In doing so, I illustrate 
that the finances oflocal government were subject to increasing legislative oversight 
during that period. I also illustrate New Zealand's growing independence from 
England in the development of local government law. 
The funding and spending decisions of councils have always been subject to 
some form of control. The municipal councils that were established in 1842 only 
existed for four years, 10 but had constraints placed on their power to make financial 
decisions. Municipal councils could only levy rates, and spend funds, for purposes 
expressly permitted by ordinance. 11 Supervision of that limit on their finances by 
central government was minimal. Municipal councils were not required to record 
4 Maori had a well-established system of local self-government that pre-dated the Colonial system. 
See Claudia Orange The Treaty ofWaitangi (Bridget Williams Books Limited, Wellington, 1987) 37. 
5 Christine Cheyne "Public Involvement in Local Government in New Zealand - A Historical 
Account" in Empowering Communities?: Representation and Participation in New Zealand 's Local 
Government (Wellington, Victoria University Press, 2002) 116, 118. 
6 Claudia Scott and others "Positioning New Zealand Local Government" (Working Paper, October 
2004, Local Futures, Victoria University of Wellington) 2. 
7 
CD foster and others Local Government Finance in a Unitary State (George Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1980,) 21. 
8 Graham Bush Local Government and Politics in New Zealand (2 ed, Auckland University Press, 
Auckland, 1995) 73. 
9 Scott, above n 6, 9. 
10 See generally the New Zealand Constitution Act 1846 (UK), which provided for an alternative 
reglille. 
11 Municipal Corporations Ordinance 1842 5 Viet 8, cl 11. 
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the financial cost of their decisions, and many did not. 12 In contrast, many English 
local authorities were voluntarily producing robust financial accounts. 13 Central 
government in New Zealand, however, considered that England's relatively 
minimalist approach to regulating local government was appropriate. 
In 1876, central government reformed the structure of local government 
by dividing the country up into a series of counties. 14 As with municipal councils, 
the ultimate decision-makers in each county were elected by the citizens of that 
locality. 15 For the first time, New Zealand had a system of local government that 
was intended to work together in unison, and be actively supervised by central 
government. 16 In terms of financial controls, the Municipal Corporations Act 
1876 ("MCA 1976") may be an early example of central government' s 
juridification of the financial controls on local government. Loughlin used the 
term "juridification" to describe the English trend of central government 
codifying, in statute, the traditional practices oflocal government. 17 New Zealand 
followed England in requiring local government institutions to prepare financial 
reports; best practice (in 1842) evolved into the only lawful practice (in 1876). 
The MCA 1876 is also notable, in terms of financial controls, because it 
required councils to prepare budgets of proposed spending before setting rates. 18 
New Zealand followed England by also requiring councils to balance their 
budgets; 19 that obligation has subsequently been re-enacted and now applies to 
local authorities.20 Proposed expenditure had to equal proposed revenue. The 
amount of expenditure in the budget therefore provided the upper limit for local 
rates in the upcoming year. Councils could source additional finance from central 
12 Bush, above n 8, 63 . 
13 Foster, above n 7, 28. 
14 This discussion has the provinces established under section 72 of the New Zealand Constitution 
Act 1852 (UK). 
15 Municipal Corporations Act 1867, s 6. 
16 Cheyne, above n 5, 119. 
17 Martin Loughlin "The Juridification of Central-Local Government Relations" in Martin Loughlin, 
Legality and Locality: The Role of Law in Central-Local Government Relations (Claredon Press, 
Oxford, 1996) 364, 372. 
18 Municipal Corporations Act 1876, s 12. 
19 Foster, above n 7, 23 . 
20 Local Government Act 2002 , ss 98-102. 
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II 
government if they wanted to perform an activity not listed in the budget.
21 The 
operation of the Slaughtering and Inspection Act 1908 illustrated, however, that 
obtaining funding from central government may come at a cost. Councils 
contractually received government funding on the basis that it can only be used 
for specified services,
22 and that those services are performed to a standard that 
benefited the community. 
Indeed, in the early 20
th century, councils were not statutorily required to 
act m the best interests of their locality. Councils were required to deliver 
specified services,
23 but it was a political decision by Councillors as to how those 
services were delivered. Bush suggests that political pressure at this time was 
particularly effective at ensuring that decision-makers acted wisely. 
24 Significant 
regulation of local government finances was therefore unnecessary. The small 
population in New Zealand at the time meant that a close connection existed 
between those persons who paid rates, and those who spent the rates. 
In that sense, local government in New Zealand initially operated pursuant 
to a political, rather than legal, constitution.
25 The behaviour of actors in local 
government was shaped by political, rather than legal, pressure. Councillors were 
encouraged to respond to the needs and wants of citizens by the prospect of re-
election. Councils therefore borrowed extensively to finance significant 
expenditure on infrastructure assets.
26 As the population grew, councils' financial 
decision-making began to illustrate the weaknesses of relying primarily on a 
political constitution. Debt spiralled out of control. In 1918, councils' 
expenditure amounted to twenty per centum of New Zealand's gross domestic 
product. To lessen the impact on interest rates, central government capped the 
21 Indeed, many local authorities in the present day also lobby central government for funding . See, 
for example, debate concerning the Government ' s proposed contribution to the Transmission Gull
y 
road redevelopment. 
22 Slaughtering and Inspection Act 1908, s 16.; See also Philip Colquhoun "Depreciation and Other 
Reserve Funds for Municipal Corporations - Other Voices in an Early Twentieth Century 
Accounting Debate" (Working Paper 22, School of Accounting and Commercial Law, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2005) 6. 
23 Slaughtering and Inspection Act 1908, s 16(l)(c). 
24 Bush, above n 8, 67. 
25 Adam Tomkins Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005) 3. 
26 Bush, above n 8, 27. 
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amount of money that local government could borrow from non-government 
entities.27 In doing so,28 central government adopted the English approach to 
handling excessive spending. 
However, in 197 4, the financial controls on local government developed a 
uniquely New Zealand flavour. The Local Government Act 1974 ("the LGA 
1974") significantly reformed the structure of, and controls on, local government 
to increase co-ordination and cohesiveness. The LGA 197 4 formalised several 
reporting practices that many local authorities had already been undertaking. 
Local authorities (as the entities are now called) had to prepare and publish annual 
plans, and report against those annual plans. Central government set out to 
encourage local authorities, and small ones in particular, to strategically plan. At 
this point, England was also writing legislation to achieve that end. The fact that 
the LGA 197 4 was frequently amended, however, illustrates that the juridification 
of those financial controls did not appease central government. The LGA 197 4 
was only the beginning of the modern form of local government as it is known 
today.29 
The next step in the evolutionary chain was a gradual change of attitude 
rather than a climatic event. In 1987, the Right Hon Roger Douglas identified five 
principles that were applicable to local authorities . 30 Greater efficiency and 
effectiveness were the key principles. This change in emphasis formed part of the 
economic reform that was known as "Rogemomics". The state (both central and 
local) was seen as being far less effective than the private sector. The Lange 
Government therefore established the Local Government Commission to 
investigate, and report on, all changes necessary to improve the effectiveness and 
accountability of local government. 31 Those changes were enacted in 1989, and 
marked a significant change in the nature of local authorities . Several local 
authorities were combined, which led to increased resources available within those 
27 Municipal Corporations Loans Act 1920. 
28 Foster, above n 7, 78 . 
29 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power (4 ed, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 2004) 232 . 
30 Ibid, 235 . 
31 Local Government Amendment Act (No. 2) 1989. 
entities for financial reporting. Those resources were channelled, however, into 
ensuring that local authorities attempting to act efficiently and effectively. 
In 1996, and in an effort to harmonise financial reporting m the public 
sector, central government purported to equip local authorities with the tools to 
report on their efficiency and effectiveness. 32 Local authorities were required to 
report on an accruals rather than on a cash basis. The significance of that change, 
and the new duty to prepare a Funding Impact Statement, will become clearer later 
in the discussion. For now, it is sufficient to note that these changes placed New 
Zealand at the forefront of international public sector accounting. New Zealand was 
the first country to report in that manner. Thus, New Zealand had obtained 
legislative independence from England. We certainly take our lead from England 
when considering potential amendments to legislation, but are free to go our own 
way- that is the New Zealand model of local government. 
III LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 
A Policy 
We are now traced through to the present legislation. The primary entity in 
local government at this point is the local authority. The purpose of local 
authorities, according to the Local Government Act 2002 ("LGA 2002"), is to act in 
the best interests of their locality. 33 Councillors are primarily elected to assess 
ratepayers ' conflicting interests and make decisions that benefit most of their 
community. 34 This paper does not address the financial accountability the other 
multi and single purpose bodies in local government. 
Madison stated that: 35 
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men 
who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of 
32 Local Government Amendment Act (No. 3) 1996. 
33 Local Government Act 2002, s 13. 
34 Colin Scott, above n 1, 38 . 
35 Madison Federalist, No. 57. 
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DI 
the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping 
them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust. 
The separation between those who pay taxes and those who make decisions 
about how taxes should be spent, 36 creates the need for mechanisms of 
accountability. Madison's principle, which was directed at central government, 
therefore applies to local government. Local authorities should therefore respond to 
the needs of their locality rather than implement personal agendas. Accountability 
is the process by which ratepayers understand and challenge decisions made by 
local authorities on their behalf 37 Trust in mechanisms of accountability is a central 
precondition to the legitimate delegation of authority by citizens to the state.38 The 
LGA therefore places great emphasis on ensuring that elected members of local 
authorities make transparent, and fiscally prudent, decisions and communicate those 
decisions to citizens. 
B Statutory Objectives 
Central government has set out a series of general principles that, in its 
view, will guide local authorities to make good decisions on behalf of their 
communities. Section 13 essentially notes that local authorities should:39 
(i) promote the social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of 
communities, in the present and for the future. 
(ii) conduct its business in an open, transparent, and democratically accountable 
manner; and 
(iii) give effect to its identified priorities and desired outcomes in an efficient and 
effective manner: 
(iv) collaborate and co-operate with other local authorities and bodies as it 
considers appropriate to promote or achieve its priorities and desired outcomes, 
and make efficient use of resources; and 
36 Irene S Rubin The Politics of Public Budgeting (5 ed, CQ Press, Washington, 2006) 183 . 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, 39. 
39 Local Government Act 2002 , s 13 . 
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(v) undertake any commercial transactions m accordance with sound business 
practices; and 
(vi) ensure prudent stewardship and the efficient and effective use of its resources 
in the interests of its district or region. 
The emphasis on managing assets efficiently and effectively reflects the 
fact that elected councilors are caretakers of local resources. Much like directors 
of companies in the private sector,40 elected councilors must maintain and develop 
resources to achieve their objectives. Many governments in Australasia and 
Europe have recognized the parallels,41 in this regard, between the public and 
private sector. Private sector-style objective measures of performance have 
therefore been introduced into the public sector. In 1994, New Zealand required 
central government to be fiscally responsible. 42 Local authorities have, for years, 
voluntarily prepared accounting reports solely for internal consumption.43 The 
duty to be fiscally responsible was nevertheless extended to local authorities in 
1996.44 Local authorities were, and still are required to prepare policies on rating 
and funding, investments and liabilities. These policies, which are subject to the 
unreasonableness test in judicial review, set out the financial limits within which 
local authorities can operate and are discussed below in relation to the Greening 
of the Quays. Indeed, local authorities were also required to prepare publicly 
available financial reports that satisfied the same standards as those in the private 
sector. 
C Reporting Obligations 
Today, the LGA lists the accounting reports that central government has 
deemed local authorities must prepare at defined intervals. The list includes both 
financial (quantitative) and non-financial (qualitative) reports. Most of local 
authorities' financial reporting obligations are simply carried forward from the 
oft-amended Local Government Act 1974. Local authorities must still adopt 
40 R Watts and J Zimmerman Positive Accounting Theory (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1986) 7. 
41 IASC Foundation 2002, Foundation Constitution. 
42 Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994. See also Public Finance Act 1989. 
43 Bush, above n 8, 77 . 
44 Local Government Amendment Act (No. 2) 1996, s 5. 
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accounting procedures that are consistent with generally accepted accounting 
practice ("GAAP").45 The accounting profession created a series of standards to 
guide accountants on the accepted accounting practice for frequently recurring 
transactions. The standards were primarily designed for private sector entities,46 
but adequately cover most transactions in the public sector. The presentation of 
financial reports in the public and private sectors are therefore substantially 
similar. 
In addition to the budgeting process, the following are the main financial 
reports that local authorities prepare:47 
(a) The Statement of Financial Position (which measures assets, liabilities and 
ratepayers' equity); 
(b) The Statement of Financial Performance (which measures revenue, 
expenditure and surplus["profit"]/loss); and 
(c) The Statement of Cash Flows. 
These backwards-looking documents record the efficiency and effectiveness 
of local authorities in financial terms. Performance is assessed by comparing the 
figures to previous time periods, or to other local authorities. A "good" local 
authority is one that increases assets and ratepayers' equity [wealth] and makes a 
surplus. It therefore applies private-sector language and values to the public 
sector. Do most political ideologies consider an administration that makes money 
out of its citizens to be a "good" government? The LTCCP and local authorities' 
other reports are used by many sectors of society. Different users of accounting 
information may have different perspectives on the purpose of local authorities' 
preparing financial reports, and the strength of the nexus between accounting and 
accountability. This paper therefore examines the Wellington City Council's 
"Greening of the Quays" project, and illustrates that the perceived strengths and 
weaknesses of accounting as a method of accountability varies among the key 
players in local government. 
45 Local Government Act 2002, sch 10. 
46 IFAC, NZIAS 1, para 1.12. 
47 Local Government Act 2002 , s 93 , sch 10. 
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IV PERSPECTIVES 
A Actors 
From local authorities' perspective, the preparation of externally-
orientated accounting documents has three purposes. First, the documents are a 
means of involving citizens in debate about the proposed allocations of 
resources. 48 Use as an instrument of financial accountability is an important, but 
secondary, objective. Secondly, preparing the reports is intended to buttress local 
authorities' internal accounting systems,49 and facilitate efficient and effective and 
efficient decision-making. Thirdly, local authorities prepare the documents to 
discharge their reporting obligations to central government. The diligent 
preparation of reporting documents is perceived as a means of staving off further 
government regulation. 50 
From central government's perspective, local authorities' decision-making 
during the Project (and in all other instances) must be monitored to ensure 
compliance with the law. Despite local authorities having their own democratic 
mandate,51 the public occasionally holds central government politically 
responsible for systemic failings in local government. 52 The LTCCP, in 
particular, further demarcates the circumstances when local authorities can be 
held primarily responsible (and therefore) accountable for particular decisions. 
Loughlin might suggest that requiring the preparation accounting reports in this 
manner is the quid pro quo of granting local authorities the general power of 
competence. 53 The task of providing of providing certain welfare services has 
been devolved to local authorities. Councilors have more autonomy. Perhaps, 
48 New Zealand Society of Local Government Managers Dollars and Sense: Financial Management 
Under the Local Government Act 2002 (New Zealand Society of Local Government Managers, 
Wellington, 2007) 3. 
49 Wellington City Council "Project Update 9" (15 June 2007) 2. (Obtained Under Official 
Information Request to the Wellington City Council). 
50 Loughlin above n 17, 372. 
51 Eugene Meecham, et al, "The Constitutional Legal Status of Municipalities 1849-2004: Success is 
a Journey, But Also a Destination" (2007) 22 National Journal of Constitutional Law 1, 11. 
52 See citizens' response to the shortcomings of the Resource Management Act 1991. 
53 Martin Loughlin, above n 17, 378; Local Government Act 2002, s 12. 
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because of distrust, central government has juridified the reporting relationship. 
Practices which once occurred as a matter of good judgment are now required by 
law. 
Elected council ors are accountable to all citizens residing in a locality. 54 It 
is irrelevant whether those citizens voted for them, or even voted in the election or 
are even ratepayers. 55 Citizens therefore need to be informed oflocal authorities ' 
decision-making, and be able to challenge it. 
B Case Study: Greening of the Quays 
The "Greening of the Quays" project ("the project") undertaken by the 
Wellington City Council ("the Council") illustrates the value of non-financial 
reporting. In May 2005 , after public consultation, the councillors resolved that 
J ervois and Customhouse Quays should be redeveloped and a new median barrier 
with evergreen trees be installed. In the Long Term Community Consultative 
Plan ("LTTCP") and 2005/06 annual plan, 56 $2.5m had previously been approved 
for redeveloping the waterfront. The Council allocated the full amount to the 
Greening the Quays project, and tenders were duly sought from the private sector 
to complete the project. 57 All tenders exceeded the allocated funds and, after 
negotiations, the Council agreed to pay $3 .3m. Mayor Kerry Prendergast 
exercised strong leadership to ensure that the Council ' s' s flagship project was 
completed in despite the budget shortfall. $800,000 was diverted from a capital 
expenditure item that had stalled to pay for the project. 
The Greening of the Quays project has had, and will continue to have, an 
impact on the financial statements of the Council. Funds for waterfront 
redevelopment first appeared in the Council's LTCCP for the decade beginning 
2005/06. The Council allocated it funds in response to a series of studies 
commissioned in the 1990s, which examined ways of improving the city. The 
54 Local Government Act 2002, s 13 . 
55 See generally Roberts v Hopwood [1925] AC 578 . 
56 Wellington City Council Annual Plan 2005/06 (Wellington City Council, Wellington 2005) 177. 
57 Wellington City Council "Project Update 7" (15 April 2007) 2. (Obtained Under Official 
Information Request to the Wellington City Council) . 
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studies identified that the waterfront region needed developing and estimated the 
cost of doing so . Upon construction, the project caused the account labelled 
"waterfront assets" to increase from its 2005/06 level by $1 .9m. Construction 
was ultimately financed by rates collected during that period. 
58 The "cash" 
account was therefore $1.9m lower than if the project had not occurred. Does that 
mean the Council was held financially accountable by the public for the project? 
Did the Council act in a financially prudent manner? This paper analyses the 
Council ' s accountability for the project in light of the various players of local 
government. 
C LTCCP 
Since 2002, local authorities have been legally required to prepare and 
publish Long Term Community Consultative Plans ("LTCCPs"). Central 
government introduced the long-term budgets after it adjudged successive local 
authorities to have made short-sighted and ill-advised spending decisions. For 
example, the Auckland Regional Council failed to prepare a cost benefit analysis 
for the Britomart project, New Zealand 's largest and most expensive public work. 
The Council ' s financial analysis "not comprehensive" and "there were 
weaknesses in the consultative process".59 
Local authorities have acknowledged that it 1s important for them to 
engage with the other actors in local government. Local Government New 
Zealand noted that local authorities must be responsive to the needs of ratepayers 
if they are to make efficient and effective decisions for their locality. Local 
authorities may identify those needs and wants by engaging with ratepayers. The 
L TCCP is one form of dialogue between the actors in local government. It 
provides ratepayers and central government with information about the cost of 
decisions proposed by local authorities. Proposed service delivery is identified, 
together with the cost of delivery, and Councillors ' views on the appropriate 
sources of funding. 60 All are presented in one document, which is intended to 
58 Wellington City Council Annual Report 2006/07 (Wellington City Council, Wellington 2007) 10. 
59 Auditor-General 
60 Local Government Act 2002, s9, sch 10. 
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bring home the trade-off to readers. 61 Local authorities' duty to balance their 
budget means that greater expenditure must be matched with greater funding. 
That funding may come from higher rates or converting more services to user-
pays. The document thus records, in financial terms, Councillors ' initial attempt 
at balancing the conflicting interests of ratepayers. 
Draft LTCCPs (and annual plans) are intensely political documents. 
Ratepayers can therefore, in theory, 62 assess whether a local authority has 
appropriately matched the burden of rating (or other charges) with those who have 
the ability to pay. The LTCCP is one form of dialogue between ratepayers and 
local government. Ratepayers can comment on proposed allocations and 
Councillors use their political judgment in deciding whether to action any 
suggested changes. Once a local authority has formally adopted an LTTCP, that 
document becomes a political agreement between the local authority and its 
citizens. 
Many local governments around the world prepare long-term planning 
documents. Pallot considers the LTCCP to be particularly robust in comparison 
to those other documents. 63 First, the L TTCP span ten years whereas the reports 
prepared in other countries are rarely for more than three years. Secondly, 
expenditure is often provided in detail for only the first year in reports by other 
countries. Pallot suggests these features of New Zealand ' s reporting regime 
contribute to New Zealand ' s local authorities being more transparent than most 
institutions of local government around the world. Placing New Zealand ' s 
financial framework in an international context is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, the features of New Zealand ' s system that she highlights/identifies 
suggest that 
The Project estimates in the LTCCP, and the actual figures in the annual 
reports, were prepared using accrual accounting principles. The LGA now 
61 New Zealand Society of Local Government Managers, above n 48 , 55 . 
62 Alley and others New Zealand Taxation 2006(Thomson Brookers, Wellington, 2006) 13 . 
63 J Pallot "Accrual Accounting in the Public Sector" (Working Paper No. 10, Canterbury University, 
2005). 
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reqmres local authorities now account on an accrual rather than cash basis.
64 
Accrual accounting divides the life of the entity into distinct periods, typically a 
year but it may be shorter. Transactions are therefore recorded when the legal 
obligation to pay, or right to be paid, arises rather than when cash is paid or 
received. This allows revenue to be recorded when earned, and expenses 
deducted when incurred. 
The significance of accrual accounting for the purposes of accountability 
is two-fold. First, in terms of planning it allows the cost of particular decisions to 
be forecasted with greater accuracy.
65 Councilors and citizens can more 
accurately identify when costs will be incurred. The two accounting methods 
ultimately record the same amounts over the life of the entity, but differ on 
timing. The use of accrual accounting in the Greening the Quays project does 
therefore have a second real effect. Councilors find it more difficult to ' shift' the 
cost of a project, using accounting, until after the relevant triennial election. 
66 In 
terms of the Project, this meant the final million dollar payment fell due days 
before the election. Accrual accounting therefore makes the information 
contained in the LTCCP and other financial documents more timely and relevant, 
which aids users holding local authorities to account. Rubin notes that there can 
be a tension between budgets promoting accountability, on the one hand, and 
communicating a message that is acceptable to local government actors, on the 
other. That may mean obscuring the nature or cost of a particular decision. 
From local authorities' perspective, the LTCCP is an important cog in the 
wheels of accountability. The L TCCP is intended to ensure that local authorities 
act in citizens' best interests when exercising those functions .
67 It, together with 
accounting more generally, is a tool for generating debate about the proper 
allocation of resources. Most local authorities therefore undertake the costly, and 
time-intensive-task, of ensuring that the LTTCP is as realistic as possible. 
Councilors receive draft budgets from departments within the organisation, which 
64 Local Government Act 2002, sch 10. 
65 Janet Mack and Christine Ryan Is there an Audience for Public Sector Reports? 20 IPJSM 2, 6. 
66 Ibid. 
67 New Zealand Society of Local Government Managers, above n 48 , 1. 
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must justify departments' funding requests.68 In addition to encouraging greater 
financial awareness at the point of delivery, receiving budgets from service-
providers is also likely to result in the most realistic forecasts reaching the 
LTCCP. Ratepayers are therefore provided with the information, and 
opportunity, to ask Councilors the right questions: Is it appropriate to spend 
millions redeveloping the Quays? Should current ratepayers bear most of the 
funding burden? Is the WCC complying with its policies and the LGA? Local 
authorities assume that citizens are sufficiently financially literate to understand 
and process the information contained in the LTCCP. 69Unfortunately, that 
assumption may be misguided. 
D Flaws in Policies 
Ratepayers (and other readers) failed to identify two fundamental flaws 
with the Project. First, the Council contravened its "Liabilities Policy" when it 
decided how to fund the project. The policy states that capital expenditure should 
"primarily" be financed from long term borrowing rather than current rates. The 
project is capital expenditure according to the relevant accounting standards. 70 
The redevelopment satisfies the definition of an "asset" because it has 
significantly improved Jervois Quay and it is likely to benefit the community for 
many years to come. Long-term borrowing provided only 25% of funding for the 
Project, and thus cannot be considered the "primary" means of financing the 
redevelopment. The Council acted ultra vires. Indeed, the second flaw with the 
Project also concerns financing. The Council exceeded, by 25 percent, the $2.Sm 
budget for the Project set out in the L TCCP. If accounting was a fully functioning 
accountability mechanism, ratepayers (or, at least, the media) would have 
identified these issues,7 1 and made the appropriate people aware of the errors. 
The particular accounting flaws with the Project may be isolated incidents. 
Aside from smaller local authorities failing to adequately prepare L TCCPs, it is 
68 Wellington City Council "Project Update l " (15 May 2005) 1. (Obtained under Official 
Information Request to the Wellington City Council) . 
69 New Zealand Society of Local Government Managers, above n 48 , 78 . 
70 NZ IAS 7, para 7 .1 7. 
71 The Council was not aware of the issue until I discussed the issue. 
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rare for local authorities to material misstatement their accounts. 72 Systemic 
weaknesses in local authorities' accounting systems may, however, exist. The 
WCC has acknowledged that, in relation to the Project, there may have been an 
error with their accounting systems. 73 The head of the accounting department 
failed to ensure that Councilors' decision to reallocate funds from another project 
was reflected in the accounts. No documents were formally altered to reflect the 
increased funds that the WCC awarded the project. Accurate information is 
crucial to good decision-making. 74 Inaccurate information may reduce citizens' 
ability to participate in debate with Councilors and hold their elected 
representatives to account. 
V ACCOUNTING ACTORS 
A Auditor 
Citizens (and some in central government) may legitimately expect 
published and audited financial documents to be free from such errors. L TCCPs 
and other financial documents are audited by, or on behalf of, the Auditor-
General. Most local authorities receive "unqualified audit opinions", 75 but it does 
not follow that the financial statements are therefore free from error. The auditor 
only expresses her unqualified opinion that the reports were free from material 
misstatement or fraud. 76She does not undertake that the reports are, in fact, free 
from all errors. The Auditor-General has stated that any breach of the law or local 
authorities' policy is automatically material whatever the dollar amount. 77 Jacobs 
suggests the high threshold is fully justified. 78 Citizens' expect officials to spend 
72 Office of the Auditor General Rates Inquiry (Office of the Auditor General, Wellington, June 
2007) 72. 
73 Wellington City Council "Project Update 11 " (15 July 2005) 1. (Obtained under Official 
Information Request to the Wellington City Council) . 
74 AH Marshall Financial Administration in Local Government (George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 
London, 1960) 14. 
75 Office of the Auditor General Rates Inquiry (Office of the Auditor General, Wellington, June 
2007) 13 . 
76 Wellington City Council Annual Report 2006/07 (Wellington City Council, Wellington 2007) 137. 
77 Rates Inqui,y (Office of the Auditor General, Wellington, June 2007) 13 . 
78 Kerry Jacobs "Value for Money Auditing in New Zealand: Competing for Control in the Public 
Sector" 30 British Accounting Review 342, 344. 
public money in a manner that benefits the public and is lawful. It is therefore 
problematic that the WCC 's breach of its Liability Policy remained undetected. 
It is unsurprising, however, that the auditors did not discover the Project ' s 
cost was understated given there was no breach of law or policy. The WCC's 
audited 2005/06 Annual Report incorrectly reported that the Project was within its 
budget of $2.5 million. The extra $800,000 was not mentioned. Auditors 
generally consider changes of more than five percent of total expenditure are 
material. $800,000 is only a fraction of the WCC 's $350 million budget. 
Auditors do expressly inform readers of their audit opinion that immaterial errors 
or fraud may still be present in audited reports . Unqualified audit opinions, 
however, do provide some confidence that local authorities have accurately 
reported transactions. In contrast, a set of accounts that is subject to a qualified 
audit opinion is almost definitely inaccurate and therefore of little value to 
ratepayers in discussing matters with authorities. 
79 A qualified opinion therefore 
signals to citizens and central government that the particular local authority could 
be more financially accountable. Local authorities have a political incentive to 
obtain an unqualified opinion. 
B Accountants' Judgment 
Indeed, financial statements that receive an unqualified audit opinion may 
still contain fishhooks for readers to overcome before the document becomes an 
effective accountability mechanism. From an accounting perspective, there are 
some strains on the nexus between local authorities preparing financial statements 
and users holding those authorities to account. Accounting standards may provide 
the tools for a local authority to appear well within the thresholds set out in 
financial policies and the LGA when, in substance, it is close to breaching the 
threshold. 80 Accounting does not always involve the mechanical application of 
rules. The standards afford considerable scope for judgrnent to be legitimately 
exercised in the preparation of accounts. When faced with choices as to the 
79 Deegan and Sam.kin New Zealand Financial Accounting (2 ed, McGraw Hill, Auckland, 2004) 12. 
so Ibid, 37 . 
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appropriate accounting measure, local authorities have tended to adopt the 
measure that puts them within, rather than outside, the relevant threshold. 
C Councillors' Judgment 
A local authority (and in particular, the eouncilors who are responsible for 
preparing the reports) may occasionally encounter incentives to adopt accounting 
techniques that it would not normally adopt. 81 For example, local authorities face 
political and legal pressures to maintain a balanced budget. 82 In light of the 
public perception that rates are too high, local authorities that run a surplus may 
face public criticism and, ultimately, punishment at the polls. Local authorities 
have responded to this, and other, pressure by deciding to frequently revalue the 
land under roads. 83 The value under such land is difficult to determine. 
Accounting standards require land assets to be valued at the price that a willing 
buyer and seller would agree in an arms length transaction.84 As with many 
unique assets in the public sector, there is no relevant market. Valuation is 
therefore inherently subjective. As the land under roads is a billion dollar asset 
for the wee, changes in value may significantly alter its financial position. 
Users of financial statements need to be aware that the figures in the financial 
statements may legitimately be managed. Earnings management places 
significant strain on the nexus between accounting and accountability because it is 
difficult to detect from outside local authorities. 
D Readability 
It is difficult to assess from financial reports whether local authorities are 
acting efficiently and effectively. It is particularly difficult for citizens to trace a 
particular project or transaction through the accounts and thereby assess whether a 
local authority has acted in a fiscally responsible manner. A publication listing all 
transactions may stretch for thousands of pages. It may also reduce readers' 
awareness of particularly important issues. The Annual Report necessarily 
81 Local Government Act 2002, sch 10. 
82 Local Government Act 2002, s 100. 
83 Office of the Auditor General, above n 72, 79. 
84 IF AC, NZIAS 6, 6.1. 
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provides a very general picture of the financial position and performance of local 
authorities. The technical nature of financial reports forces many citizens to rely 
on the commentary accompanying the Annual Report. As demonstrated earlier, 
the commentary to the annual report is not the most reliable guide to the reports. 
It is written by those responsible for preparing reports: the elected Councillors.85 
The commentary is intended to highlight those points that Councillors wish the 
public to know. One therefore returns to the criticism levelled early in this part. 
Local authorities are na"ive in assuming that most citizens will be able to trace 
through the financial reports and contribute to the funding and expenditure debate. 
Financial reports fail to fully inform citizens and central government 
whether local authorities have made progress towards achieving their statutory 
objectives. Financial statements primarily provide information concerning the 
profitability and financial stability of entities. Local authorities are not profit-
orientated. For example, the fact that a library operated within budget does not 
necessarily mean it stocks the books that the public wants to read. Problems arise 
because the social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of a locality 
cannot be adequately measured in money. 86 Local authorities' objectives are 
expressed as qualitative outcomes rather than objectively measurable criteria. 
The Act does not expressly provide a mechanism for determining which decisions 
are in the best interests of the public. 
E Qualitative Outcomes 
Accountants responded to this criticism by developing the Statement of 
Service Performance specifically for the public sector. 87 It measures the outputs 
that a local authority said it would deliver against the level of output that it 
actually achieved. For example, a local authority may plan to put 5,000 people in 
Council houses, but actually only house 4,600. The shortfall implies that the 
authority did not achieve its qualitative outcomes. Output is measured as a proxy 
to the qualitative outcomes. The Auditor-General has acknowledged that 
85 Local Government Act 2002, sch 10. 
86 Office of the Auditor General, above n 72, 79. 
87 Ibid, 1089. 
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measuring outputs may be the most effective means of ensuring that local 
authorities are acting in the best interests of their locality. 88 The Project illustrates 
that, while a positive step forward, it has inherent limitations. Measuring service 
performance may be sufficient when the expenditure in issue relates to services. 
Accounting obviously relies on numbers. If something cannot be numerically 
measured, however, it does not exist for accounting purposes. Capital 
expenditure projects may contribute to the achievement of statutory objectives, 
but one cannot quantify the extent. The public is still left without an objective 
yardstick around which they can debate the merits of certain proposals. 
VI JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE 
From the perspective of the judiciary, accounting is a key element in 
holding local government accountable. Rating and expenditure decisions are 
routinely questioned in courts. 89 Those claims have included challenges to the 
appropriate level of rates, the allocation of the rating burden, and proposed 
expenditure. In the leading case on rates, the Court of Appeal in Woolworths v 
Wellington City Council recognised that cases concerning local authorities ' 
finances are likely to raise issues inherently political issues. 9° For example, is it 
just that corporate ratepayers invariably bear a rates burden that exceeds the 
resources that they consume? The court effectively noted that, subject to 
unreasonableness, rating decisions are political matters to be decided by 
democratically elected Councillors. Dissatisfaction should be expressed in the 
political, rather than legal, arena. 
The effect of the decision, for present purposes, is that it places a greater 
onus on accounting reports to effectively hold local authorities to account. Prior 
to Woolworths, courts had firmly stated that local authorities owed citizens a 
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their community.91 In assessing 
whether a local authority had breached that duty, courts were asking intensely 
88 Office of the Auditor General, above n 72 , 188. 
89 Kenneth Palmer Local Government Law in New Zealand (2 ed, The Law Book Company, Ltd, 
1993) 330. 
90 Woolworths v Wellington City Council [1996] 2 NZLR 53 7, 544 Richardson P . 
91 Ibid . 
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political questions about the merits of particular decisions. By displaying a 
deferential attitude to local authorities in Woolworths, the Court of Appeal 
appears to have significantly narrowed the scope of the fiduciary duty owed to 
citizens.92 The judicial deference in Woolworths appears to mix policy with 
pragmatism. If courts regularly entertained the possibility of rating or expenditure 
decisions being challenged, the floodgates may open. 
Further, from a more principled point of view, this paper has demonstrated 
that it is particularly difficult to assess whether particular conduct is in the 
interests of a locality. It would be intellectually dishonest to suggest that the 
judiciary can identify the conduct that is in the best interests of a locality: people 
legitimately disagree about the best course of action. The retrenchment that 
occurred in Woolworths was therefore consistent with the notion of representative 
democracy. Indeed, Griffiths notes that a key tenet of political constitutionalism 
is that political decisions are made by political actors. 93 Woolworths does, 
however, mean that if New Zealand is to improve the accountability of local 
authorities, any significant reform must be done by the legislature. 
The current law and policy govemmg local authorities' financial 
management does communicate the business of local authorities to citizens and 
ratepayers, but it also has significant flaws. The key weaknesses are two-fold. 
First, the inability to link the qualitative outcomes that are expressed in the LGA 
with an objective measure of performance. It is a barrier to ratepayers and central 
government understanding the information presented and therefore a barrier to 
supervising the appropriateness of local authorities' decision-making. The actors 
in local government find it difficult to engage in a debate about whether particular 
expenditure has achieved particular statutory objectives. The second flaw is 
related. Uncertainty over the content of local authorities ' statutory objectives has 
permitted successive Councilors to pass underinvestment off as justifiable as a 
matter of political ideology. In light of these flaws, it is advisable to consider 
mechanisms to improve local authorities ' financial management. 
92 Andrew Butler (ed) Equity and Trusts in New Zealand (Brookers, Wellington, 2003) 1108. 
93 JAG Griffith "The Political Constitution" (1979] 42 MLR 1, 16. 
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VI PERSONAL LIABILITY 
A Introduction 
In 1867, central government introduced the surcharge provisions into local 
government. Those provisions meant that Councillors may be personally liable if 
they abuse the power conferred on them by the citizens in their locality. The 
following discussion analyses whether that potential for personal liability 
effectively ensures Councillors, and local authorities, make decisions that are in 
the best interests of their locality. I submit that there are political and practical 
justifications underpinning the provisions, but the threshold is too high for the 
provisions to be engaged. 
B Justifications 
Provided Councillors are not acting in their personal capacity, they are 
agents of their local authority when incurring these decisions. Local authorities 
are body corporates and therefore legally distinct entities from their members. 
There are political and practical reasons for imposing personal liability on 
Councillors even though they act as agents. The political justification is rooted in 
representative democracy, a concept that was introduced earlier in this paper. The 
statutory power conferred under the LGA 2002 (and other Acts) for public 
purposes is conferred on trust.94 The power can only be exercised without legal 
impunity if it is used in the way that Parliament intended. Councillors cannot 
unilaterally confer on themselves more jurisdiction. Lord Bingham of Cornhill 
has stated that Councillors who exercise their power in an unlawful manner betray 
the trust of their citizens and commit misconduct. 95 Personal liability, on that 
approach, exists to punish Councillors for their misconduct, and deter other 
Councillors from engaging in such conduct. 
The practical justification for holding Councillors personally liable for 
unlawful conduct focuses on the effect that conduct has on their locality. The 
94 Porter v Magill [2002] AC 357, para 14 Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 
95 Ibid. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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justification is based on the premise that unlawful transactions are not in the best 
interests of localities. Given that local authorities are creatures of statute,96 
decisions become unlawful if they outside of the jurisdiction conferred by 
relevant statute. Parliament has purported to confer on local authorities the power 
of general competence. Transactions therefore only become unlawful if they 
breach an express or implied limit on the power of general competence. 97 
Parliament has considered those matters so central to effective decision-making 
that it clawed-back some of the autonomy conferred under the general power of 
competence. Personal liability exists, on this approach, to encourage effective 
and efficient decision-making that is in the interests oflocalities. 
The justifications for the surcharge provision are complementary. The 
surcharge provision (and the financial reporting obligations discussed throughout 
this paper) illustrate that administrative law sets out to achieve multiple and, at 
times, conflicting aims. Harlow and Rawlings express the tension about the 
appropriate role of the law in terms of the colours on a traffic light. 98 The 
orthodox view of administrative law dates back to Dicey; administrative law 
exists to ensure that the state does not unduly interfere with the rights of citizen.99 
That view is termed "red light theory". "Green light theory" is a more recent 
development. It holds that, in order to facilitate effective decision-making, the 
law should permit decision-makers, such as Councillors, to have some lee-way. 
"Amber light theory" is the most recent theory. It suggests that administrative 
law can aim to regulate and facilitate good decision-making at the same time. 
The multiple justifications for the surcharge provision illustrate that section 46 of 
the LGA 2002 attempts to serve both functions. The following discussion 
illustrates, however, that in practice the surcharge provision is primarily explained 
by red light theory. 
Section 46 of the LGA 2002 provides that Councillors can be liable if: 
96 Local Government Act 2002 , s 12. 
97 Note that some limits on the power of general competence (such as the consultation provisions) 
may impose significant obligations on local authorities. 
98 Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings Law and Administration (2 ed, Butterworths, London, 1997) 
58 . 
99 Ibid. 
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(a) money belonging to, or administrable by, their local authority has 
been unlawfully expended; 
(b) an asset has been unlawfully sold or otherwise disposed ofby their 
local authority; 
(c) a liability has been unlawfully incurred by their local authority; or 
( d) their local authority intentionally or negligently failed to enforce the 
collection of money it was lawfully entitled to receive. 
The Auditor-General and the Minister of Local Government are, together, 
the gatekeepers for liability under the provision. 100 Each person has a distinct role 
under section 42 of the LGA 2002, and councillors can only be personally liable if 
both of those people agree that that is appropriate. In 1912, after significant 
budget blow-outs by local authorities, New Zealand's central government enacted 
provisions that expressly permitted Councillors to be held personally liable in 
exceptional circumstances. These provisions (known as the surcharge provisions) 
were identical to the English ones existing at the time. The provisions applied to 
Councillors and senior public servants in central government. England recently 
abolished all surcharge provisions. New Zealand still retains the surcharge for 
elected Councillors. 
During every audit of a local authority, the Auditor-General must determine 
whether any of the transactions listed in section 46 of the LGA 2002 have occurred, 
and the financial cost of those transactions. Subject to unreasonableness, the 
Auditor-General's interpretation of the law is conclusive. The ambit of the 
provision therefore depends, in part, on the Auditor-General's understanding of the 
LGA 2002 and policies made pursuant to it. The Auditor-General has published 
numerous reports, 10 1 and run a series of workshops, 102 on its understanding of the 
obligations that the LGA 2002 imposes on local authorities. Councillors, and local 
authorities, therefore ought to be aware of the Auditor-General's interpretation of 
the operative provisions of the LGA 2002. Those people should act accordingly to 
reduce the probability that the Auditor-General will impugn one of their 
100 Local Government Act 2002 , s 46. 
101 See, for example, the Rates Inquiry above n 72. 
102 See, for example, the presentations on the LTCCP. 
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transactions. Indeed, most local authorities do adhere to best practice as outlined by 
the Auditor-General, 103 and thereby minimise their Councillors' exposure to 
potential liability. 
C Ambit 
It 1s difficult, however, to gauge the Auditor-General's working 
interpretation of the surcharge provision itself. The provision has never been 
applied in New Zealand, and the equivalent English provision was applied only 
once. 104 Moreover, the Auditor-General has not publicly released a robust analysis 
of its approach to the surcharge provision. That may be due to the Auditor-
General's limited resources, or its belief that Councillors' are unlikely act in a 
manner that would engage the provision. The Auditor-General is yet to formally 
explain the lack of commentary. 
Regardless of the reason for it, the lack of commentary from the Auditor-
General leaves key questions about the surcharge provision unanswered. For 
example, can Councillors be personally liable if their local authority does not act 
consistently with a statutory objective set out in section 13 of the LGA 2002? Put 
another way; is inefficient or ineffective decision-making sufficient to trigger the 
surcharge provision? The legal effectiveness of statutory provisions that set out 
general objectives for entities has not been judicially determined. Those provisions 
may, however, be analogous to purpose sections in statutes. Statements of purpose 
are expressed too generally to impose legal obligations on parties. 105 Section 13 of 
the LGA 2002 is also expressed particularly generally and is largely "aspirational" 
in nature. 106 In the LGA 2002, both types of provision in substance convey the 
social, economic, and cultural, 107 ends that Parliament intended local authorities to 
achieve. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Foster, above n 7, 88. 
105 JF Burrows Statute Law in New Zealand (3 ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2003) 166. 
106 Domain Nominee Ltd v Auckland City Council (1 September 2008) HC AK AP 68/08 para 79. 
107 Burrows, above n 105 , 166. 
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The provisions are relevant in that they colour the interpretation of other 
parts of the LGA 2002. 108 Neither the purpose provisions, nor the statutory 
objectives set out in section 13 of the LGA 2002, are purely objective criteria. The 
statutory objectives contained in the LGA 2002 may legitimately conflict. The 
notion of efficient decision-making is often associated with making decisions as 
quickly as possible. The extensive consultation procedures in the LGA 2002 
may, 109 at times, be inconsistent with efficient decision-making because of the time 
consuming nature of consultation. The Auditor-General is likely to find, for 
example, that notions of efficiency and democratic participation are inherently 
subjective and essentially political, rather than legal, questions. When one recalls 
the difficulty of measuring those criteria in quantitative terms, the Auditor-General 
may find that the issue is not appropriate for judicial or quasi-judicial resolution. 
The potentially conflicting objectives in the LGA 2002 suggest that the Auditor-
General should not regard alleged breaches of section 13 as being capable of 
triggering the surcharge provisions. To the extent that such conduct is unlawful 
independently of section 13, however, a literal reading of the surcharge provision 
suggests that Councillors may be personally liable. 
For Councillors' decisions made prior to August 2001, liability under the 
surcharge provisions arose once the Auditor-General decided the funds should be 
recovered from the Councillors. 110 That decision could be appealed to the Minister 
of Finance. 111 It was the Auditor-General, however, who had the power to initiate 
court proceedings to recover the funds if Councillors were unwilling to pay. 112 
Since 2001, liability arises upon the Auditor-General recommending to the Minister 
of Local Government that the Crown should recover the relevant funds from 
Councillors.' 13 It is now the Minister for Local Government, however, who may 
bring proceedings to recover funds if Councillors do not voluntarily pay. 114 Subject 
to judicial review, the Minister's decision is final. A member of the political 
108 See, for example, Local Government Act 2002 , ss 9 and 10. 
109 Local Government Act 2002 , ss 76 to 82 ; Such consultation may, however, promote effective 
decision-making. 
110 Public Finance Act 1977, s 76(1) . 
111 Public Finance Act 1977, s 76(2) 
11 2 Note that the last potential causes of action under the old approach became statute-barred in 
January 2008: Limitation Act 1950, s 4(1) .. 
11 3 Local Government Act 2002, s 46(1). 
114 Ibid. 
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executive therefore has responsibility for deciding whether legal steps should be 
taken to recover the funds from Councillors. 
On orthodox principles, it may be constitutionally problematic for the 
Minister of Local Government to be involved in the decision to bring proceedings. 
Montesquieu identified that the three forms of governmental power should be 
exercised by different people in order to reduce the probability of that power being 
abused. 115 Under the surcharge provision, a member of the Executive Council 
exercises a quasi-judicial function, and therefore "wears two hats". The propriety of 
conferring that quasi-judicial power to the Minister depends upon whether that 
person will act impartially, and be seen to do so, rather than abuse their position. 
The Minister of Local Government's gatekeeper function under the 
surcharge provision is justified by the existence of the recommendation from the 
Auditor-General. Receipt of the recommendation is a pre-condition of the 
Minister's power to issue proceedings. It also provides a platform from which the 
Minister can refute allegations of politically interference. The Auditor-General is 
an Officer of Parliament, and is therefore independent from the political executive. 
A recommendation of the Auditor-General therefore provides an objective basis 
upon which the Minister of Local Government can make their decision as to 
whether proceedings are appropriate under the surcharge provisions. It is also a 
means by which to share responsibility for the decision to hold Councillors liable, 
and thereby cushion any potential strain to the central-local government 
relationship. The existence of the Minister' s quasi-judicial power is thus 
problematic in theory, but positive in practice. 
There is a real probability that the relevant Minister would take their role 
seriously and act independently when deciding whether to launch proceedings. 
Other statutes have conferred quasi-judicial powers, and well-made claims of 
political interference in the exercise of those powers have been rare. 116 For 
example, several criminal statutes require the consent of the Attorney-General, the 
115 As translated in G H Sabine A History of Political Thought (3 ed, London, Harrop & Co, 1963) 
551-553. 
11 6 J J McGrath "Principles for Sharing Law Officer Power: The Role of the New Zealand Solicitor-
General" New Zealand Universities Law Review 212 , 217. 
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head law-officer in New Zealand, before a prosecution can be brought. Those 
provisions generally relate to politically sensitive matters, including espionage. 117 
In such cases, the political experience of a Minister is precisely the quality that is 
required. Some provisions, including the surcharge provision, are expressed 
broadly in order to capture relevant unwanted conduct. A side-effect is that conduct 
that may not be deserving of censure can fall within the literal meaning of the 
provision. The role of the Minister is therefore to act as a gatekeeper and ensure 
that proceedings are only launched in appropriate cases. 
11 7 Crimes Act 1961 , s 78B. 
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D Threshold 
According to the jurisprudence of the old Commonwealth, at least, there 
appear to be few situations that are sufficiently blameworthy to trigger the surcharge 
prov1s10ns. If the facts in Porter v MaGill are indication of the level of 
blameworthiness required, the threshold for triggering the provision is particularly 
high. In Porter v Ma Gill, 118 their Lordships held, for the first in an old 
Commonwealth country, that a Councillor had engaged in conduct that was 
sufficiently blameworthy to trigger the surcharge provisions. MaGill was an 
English Councillor who sat on, and chaired, a council housing committee. As a 
local body election approached, MaGill proposed that the housing committee 
resolve to sell most of the flats the council owned. The Committee agreed, and the 
houses were duly sold. Crucially, however, the sale was unlawful because the 
committee lacked the power to sell the assets. MaGill knew that the sale was 
probably unlawful when she proposed it. She pushed the sale purely to obtain a 
political advantage. Their Lordships held that, 119 Ma Gill's wilful disregard for the 
lawfulness of the transaction was sufficient to engage the surcharge provision. 
In contrast, one only need examine conduct that has not led to Councillors 
being held personally liable to picture the scale of misconduct required: 
(a) The enactment of ultra vires bylaws; 
(b) The failure to adequately prepare an LTCCP; 
(c) The Britomart project exceeding its budget by around $3m; 
( d) The posting of multi-million dollar budget blow-outs. 
The lack of case law regarding the threshold for the surcharge provisions 
may be due to Councillors making impeccable decisions. Another, more plausible, 
explanation is that most proceedings under the surcharge provisions would be 
successfully defended in court. Although proceedings under the surcharge 
provisions are civil rather than criminal in nature, 120 the LGA 2002 sets out a series 
11 8 Porter v Magill, above n 94, para 16 Lord Bingham of Cornhill. 
11 9 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
30 
of statutory defences to liability. Once the defendant Councillor has established the 
defence on the balance of probabilities, the proceedings must be dismissed. It is a 
defence that the act or failure to act resulting in the loss occurred: 
(a) without the Councillor's knowledge; or 
(b) with the Councillor's knowledge but against the Councillor's protest made at or before 
the time when the loss occurred; or 
(c) contrary to the manner in which the Councillor voted on the issue at a meeting of the 
local authority; or 
(d) in circumstances where, although being a party to the act or failure to act, the 
Councillor acted in good faith and in reliance on reports, statements, financial data, or 
other information prepared or supplied, or on professional or expert advice given, by any 
of the following persons: 
(i) an employee of the local authority whom the Councillor believed on reasonable 
grounds to be reliable and competent in relation to the matters concerned: 
(ii) a professional adviser or expert in relation to matters that the Councillor believed on 
reasonable grounds to be within the person's professional or expert competence. 
The particular defences listed in section 46( 4) of the LGA 2002 effectively 
mean Councillors can be liable only if they are morally culpable. If Councillors 
voted against the relevant transaction, or reasonably believed that the transaction 
was lawful, they are not personally liable. The surcharge provision does not prevent 
unlawful policies being enacted. It does, however, provide Councillors with a 
financial incentive to voice concerns about transactions that may be unlawful, and 
seek legal advice on the legality of those transactions. The incentive is personal to 
the individual Councillor. Political rivals may be subject to negative public 
comment if they are perceived to have "breached the rules". 121 The incentive 
therefore does not extend to persuading other Councillors that the transaction is 
unlawful. Those Councillors who vote for a relevant transaction will prima facie be 
jointly and severally liable, and may negative face political consequences. 
121 See the negative reaction that Councillor Goulden of the Wellington City Council received 
following alleged breaches of the Council's Code of Conduct. 
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E Utility of Section 
If the Auditor-General exercises its power of recommendation under the 
surcharge provisions, the relevant Councillors are prima facie jointly and severally 
liable for the entire loss incurred by the local authority in respect of their unlawful 
decision. It is therefore irrelevant whether all, or part, of that loss was not 
reasonably foreseeable . Although tortfeasors are largely immune from 
unforesseable losses, that limit on liability is absent from the LGA 2002. The 
surcharge provisions are not a statutory tort and apply only to decisions made by 
local Councillors. Personal liability under the provisions can therefore exceed the 
amount that a corresponding decision-maker in central government or the private 
sector could receive for equally unlawful conduct. Local Councillors are exposed to 
greater personal liability than actors in central government and in the private sector, 
and therefore have a greater legal incentive to act lawfully. 
The surcharge has the potential to impose a significant financial burden on 
Councillors. It is impossible to define the offence precisely, so the law goes wider 
than the mischief aimed at. 122 Palmer states that the surcharge provisions are not a 
penalty. Councillors are liable only for the amount of the loss and nothing more. 
That view, however, ignores the fact that Councillors very rarely financially benefit 
from unlawful decisions. The policy underlying the surcharge provisions cannot 
therefore be a restitution of benefits personally received. The pragmatic view is that 
liability under the surcharge provisions is a penalty for acting unlawfully. Liability 
exists to deter Councillors from acting unlawfully. How real is that deterrent effect? 
Almost all New Zealand local authorities set out the potential for Councillors ' 
personal liability in their Code of Conduct. It either forms part of the substantive 
Code or is attached as an appendix. 123 Councillors receive a copy of the Code of 
Conduct upon election, and are therefore aware of the potential for their personal 
liability. The potential for personal liability is therefore an indirect control on 
Councillors' decision-making. 
122 McGrath, above n 116, 127. 
123 Note, however, that the Code of Conduct published by the Hutt City Council in 2008 has not been 
updated to reflect the 2001 amendments to the surcharge provision. 
Central government recently affirmed that a provision imposing personal 
liability on Councillors may have a marked influence on Councillors' decision-
making. The Hon Paul Swain MP stated that a surcharge provision in the Local 
Government Act 1974 discouraged Councillors from entering into risky 
transactions to borrow funds . The provision had achieved its aim of discouraging 
local authorities therefore achieved its aim. Local authorities only borrowed from 
well-established financial institutions. The provision, however, made Councillors 
too cautious. It discouraged Councillors from authorising local authorities to enter 
into debt securities altogether. Only a single bond had been issued to the public 
since the amendment was introduced in 1996. Provided that long-term debt is 
used to finance long-term assets, issuing securities can in fact be a prudent 
financial policy. The annual interest cost ensures that future ratepayers who 
benefit from the asset contribute to its cost in addition to current ratepayers. As a 
result, the ratepayers of today were literally paying the cost of Councillors' 
caution in the form of higher rates. In light of the upward pressure of rates 
country wide, the review queried whether Councillors were reluctant to permit 
local authorities to borrow funds in case they became personally liable for the 
debt. In April 2008 , central government abolished the surcharge because of its 
overzealous bite. 
If one compares the position of Councillors to directors ( or other agents in 
the public sector) , it is clear that a higher standard is expected of Councillors. 
Directors, like Councillors, are separate legal entities from their companies. 
Personal liability attaches when the agent has acted outside the scope of his or her 
h · 124 aut onty. The veil that separates director and company can, however, be 
pierced in exceptional cases. The corporate veil is created by statute, and it can 
be pierced by some other statute if that other statute so provides. 125 Any 
Parliamentary intention to pierce the corporate veil must be expressed in clear and 
unequivocal language. Personal liability may be warranted where the transaction 
is a sham, or if the agent was fraudulent. Those circumstances are far more 
demanding than the threshold under the surcharge provisions. 
124 Reynolds Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (14 ed, Sweet & Maxwell , London, 2003) 78 . 
125 Dimbley & Sons Ltd v National Union of Journalists [I 984] 1 WLR 427, 435 (HL) Lord Diplock. 
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The surcharge provision in the LGA 2002 now sits in a rather anomalous 
position. The Public Audit Act 2001 abolished the surcharge provisions that 
applied to public servants in government departments and to other governmental 
agents. Members of Parliament in New Zealand have never had a surcharge 
provision that applied to their decisions. When the surcharge provisions were 
reviewed in 2000, the Local Government Commission supported the retention of 
the surcharge provision in the LGA 2002 in its amended form. It did not even 
query central government obtaining greater control over the surcharge provision, 
and the potential strain that triggering the provision might place on the 
relationship between central and local government. 
The English Government abolished the surcharge provisions because of that 
anomaly. 126 The surcharge provisions were perceived as a disproportionately harsh 
means of holding local Councillors to account and an unwanted aspect of local 
government. The fear of personal liability for decisions, whether real or imagined, 
discouraged some English citizens from standing for election. 127 Central 
government in New Zealand has also recognised that the cost of surcharge 
provisions can outweigh the benefits, as noted above. Perhaps the time has come to 
review whether New Zealand genuinely needs the surcharge provision in the LGA 
2002. 
126 
Ministry for Local Government "Lyons Inquiry into Local Government" (21 March 2007, 
Ministry for Local Government, London) para 3.3. 
127Ibid, para 3.7 
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VI REFORM 
In July 2006, the Government established the Royal Commission on 
Auckland Governance to review the effectiveness of the current local government 
framework in wider Auckland. 128 In mid-2008 , the Royal Commission released a 
discussion document that identified areas of concern within the framework. The 
document also invited submissions on possible methods of improving, amongst 
other things, the accountability of Auckland local authorities. The concerns 
expressed in this paper about the financial accountability of local authorities are 
largely directed at the LGA 2002, and may therefore apply to Auckland 's local 
authorities. In light of the possibility that the LGA 2002 may be amended in the 
medium term, the final part of this paper therefore addresses a method of reform 
Local authorities in England, just like those in New Zealand, have 
encountered difficulties in accurately communicating their proposed, and actual, 
performance. Citizens and central government have expressed frustration at the 
lack of transparency within local authorities. Central government responded to 
that lack of openness by introducing "best-value" system. Local authorities, and 
their subsidiaries, must make decisions that provide the best value for their 
communities. 129 "Best-Value" is defined in the Act. 130 It essentially comprises 
the statutory objectives set out in section 13 of the New Zealand LGA. Local 
authorities demonstrate they are providing the "best value" by performing well in 
a series of indicia administered by the English Audit Commission. The 
Commission is statutorily required to assess the performance of local authorities 
based on 198 performance indicators. 13 1 The indicators cover a range of matters. 
In addition to measuring the internal efficiency and effectiveness of a local 
authority, the indicia attempt to take a wider snapshot of life in the particular 
locality. For example, the indicia assess the quality of local amenities, and rate 
the health facilities available in that locality. 
128 Royal Commission on Auckland Governance <http: //www.royalcornmission.govt.nz> (last 
accessed 21 September 2008). 
129 Local Government Act 1999 (UK), s 6. 
130 Local Government Act 2000 (UK), s3. The definition was altered a year after initial enactment. 
131 Local Government Act 1999 (UK), s 6 (2) . 
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To an extent, some local authorities in New Zealand already set out to 
achieve the essence of the Best Value system. Most of the main cities prepare 
customer satisfaction surveys that attempt to measure the quality of life in that 
city. 132 The results of those surveys are recorded in their annual reports so that 
interested citizens can compare the attitudes of people living in those cities. The 
surveys themselves are similar, but not identical in content. Citizens are therefore 
not comparing like with like. Comparability is the primary advantage of adopting 
a model similar to "Best-Value". Granted, interested citizens can compare the 
numbers in annual reports, but those numbers only reveal part of what it is like to 
live in a particular locality. The performance indicators analyze a broader range 
of matters than accounting reports. The Indicators may give a more rounded 
picture of the performance of local authorities than purely financial controls. 
Performance indicators do not purport to objectively measure the progress 
towards qualitative outcomes. The English central government considers, 
however, that the presence of performance indicators is likely to pressure local 
authorities into making decisions that do provide best value for their 
communities. 133 The information provided to the actors in local government is 
therefore more likely to enable them to contribute to any policy debates. 
Adopting the English model would essentially juridify the existing practice in the 
main centres. Adopting this course of action is consistent with performance 
monitoring in the private sector, which also looks at the financial and non-
financial performance of local authorities. 134 
On balance, however, enacting English-style performance indicators into 
legislation is likely to achieve more harm than good. Local authorities must 
internally report against each of the criteria and pass that information to the Audit 
Commission each quarter. It therefore imposes a significant administrative 
burden on local authorities. The benefits, however, are twofold. As noted above, 
small local authorities already struggle at prepare the LTCCP. Imposing 
132 See the annual reports of the main centres. 
133 Local Government Act 2007 (UK), s 44. 
134 
Garrison and others Managerial Accounting (I 1 ed, McGraw Hill, Melbourne, 2004) 112. 
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additional regulation is an unnecessary juridification of the relationship between 
local authorities and other actors in local government. There is no evidence that it 
would increase citizens ' ability to contribute to debate in local government. 
Rather, further regulation may harm the relationship between central and local 
government. Imposing additional regulation is likely to send a message of 
distrust rather than partnership. It is fitting to return, at the end of this paper, to 
the other theme that flowed through the paper: New Zealand ' s legislative 
independence from England. As Hammond J has recently stated, 135 
VII CONCLUSION 
The financial management of local authorities reflects a balance between 
the interests of the main actors in local government. The LGA 2002, together 
with the Local Government Rating Act 2002, sets out the guiding financial 
framework within which local authorities must act. Discretion is afforded to local 
authorities in the form of finance policies. Local authorities set their own limits 
in terms of borrowing and investment. The Greening of the Quays project, 
however, illustrates that it is important to remember the purposes of accounting. 
It performs a red light function in that it helps regulate decision-making. If 
Councillors wilfully or deliberately act unlawfully, the Auditor-General may use 
accounting information to hold that person to account. Accounting also performs 
a green light function in that it may enable citizens to have the information and 
opportunity to be involved in the funding and rates-setting process. Only when 
accounting reports do that will the documents be an effective conduit for local 
authority accountability. 
135 Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board and others (25 September 2008, 
CAl54/07, CA, Arnold, Ellen France and Hammond JJ) para 391 Hammond J. 
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